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Book Reviews
MovIEs, CENsonsmp, AN T= LAW. By Ira H. Carmen. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1966. Pp. x, 339. $7.95.
Movies, Censorship, and the Law is an extensive, thorough treat-
ment of regulatory policies of state and local government agencies
dealing with films in which the author1 has emphasized the impact of
court decisions on censors. The first half of the volume is a basic
constitutional law analysis of cases through 1965 relating not only to
movies but to larger freedom of speech questions. Carmen shows how
free speech law developed and then later became applicable to movies.
The emphasis on analysis rather than description is welcome; the
reader will find himself recalling cases he has read before but re-
members only in terms of a general holding. In the second half of
the book, Carmen discusses state and local censorship systems, with
particular attention given to those operating when he wrote. When we
realize that less than one-fifth of the states have had a censorship
system (as compared with almost universal enactment of subsequent-
punishment obscenity statutes), the constitutional problem is placed
in some perspective.
Approximately fifty localities appear to have some censorship
mechanism, most of them haphazard; only Chicago, Atlanta, Memphis,
and Detroit, all discussed at length, have systematic action. Carmen's
format for dealing with state and local systems is uniform: first, a
statutory exposition, in which provisions of the relevant act(s) are
compared with court opinions; second, changes or revisions in the
law; third, state court cases, particularly those dealing with individual
movies; and fourth, a discussion of interviews conducted with censor-
ship officials. After examining the disposition of state decisions by the
United States Supreme Court, the author focuses on the state court
cases, showing how the Court's rulings were received.
Carmen makes several important points in his analysis of the
significant cases. Courts have not treated the movies on the same
basis as other modes of expression, following the ruling in Mutual
Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio,2 in which movies
were held to be only entertainment and business. The author also
I Associate Professor of Political Science, Coe College, Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
2236 U.S. 230 (1915).
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points out that Mutual Film was decided before Gitlow v. New York,3
in which the first amendment was applied to the states. Thus the line
of cases evolving from that application developed after an initial
determination that movies did not come within the scope of free
speech. Even if the temporal sequence had been the reverse, it might
have made no difference. Despite the "incorporation" of the first
amendment in Gitlow, the Justices' view of movies might have been
the same post-Gitlow as before it.
In addition to considering cases obviously having to do with
censorship and movies, Carmen also discusses cases dealing with
parade permits and retail licenses which, at first blush, may not seem
directly relevant, but have much to say concerning the discretion of
government officials and the use of prior restraint. The different types
of "prior restraint" are well selected by the author to give a clear
distinction between licensing, injunction procedures of the type used
in Kingsley Books v. Brown,4 and morality commissions.
An interesting sidelight is given to Near v. Minnesota,5 regarded
by many as standing against prior restraint. Justice Hughes remarked
that states could prevent obscenity and Carmen demonstrates the
definite implications of this remark for the subsequent history of
censorship. Burstyn v. Wilson 6 is often quoted in support of the
proposition that "sacrilegious" is too vague to be permissible. Car-
men shows there was another major point to the case: that movies
have the same status as other forms of expression. However, both
the second Times Film Corporation v. Chicago7 and Freedman v.
Maryland make it clear that the Justices still do not think of movies
as being of the same "rank" as other forms of expression. While Freed-
man improved the due process standards in movie censorship, both
cases made it evident that a decision giving movies the same status
as other means of expression did not mean that movies had to be
treated the same.
Important state supreme court cases, particularly those in which
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari or issued per
curiam rulings, are analyzed. The seeming simplicity of the per
curiam decisions is shown to be illusory, particularly when the
Supreme Court's result is read in connection with the lower court's
3268 U.S. 652 (1925).
4354 U.S. 436 (1957).
5 230 U.S. 697 (1931).6343 U.S. 495 (1952).
7 365 U.S. 43 (1961). The first, less well-known, was a per curiam
reversal of Chicago's refusal to license a movie. 139 F. Supp. 837 (N.D. Ill.
1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355 U.S. 35 (1957).
8380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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opinion. An interesting sidelight is cast on the later decision in
Roth v. United States8 by an earlier Supreme Court per curiam opinion
overturning a Kansas ruling which had upheld a refusal to issue a
permit on the grounds "The Moon Is Blue" was "obscene."' 0 At least
one implication might have been that the Court was restricting the
use of obscenity as a grounds for limiting modes of expression.
The confusion created by Burstyn, with additional cases coming
to the Court as a result, is an example of the Court making work for
itself. The per curiam responses to those post-Burstyn appeals com-
pounded an already unclear situation. This is similar to the post-
Roth process, when the Court used the per curiam device to dispose
of One, Incorporated v. Olesen" and Sunshine Book Company v.
Summerfield,'2 leaving the implication that homosexuality and nudity
(even in unretouched photographs) were not within the ambit of the
"obscene." Both sequences are illustrations of the proposition that
"Courts are more likely to become arenas for further development of
policy when court opinions are ambiguous than when the opinions
are precise."13
Carmen makes clear that the Supreme Court, which had deferred
defining obscenity for many years, could have deferred the problem
still longer. Roth did not require a definition, because no issue of the
material's obscenity was raised. The author notes the whole raft of
questions which can be asked about the lack of precision in Justice
Brennan's definition and concludes that the issue is not simply the
definition itself but the "constitutionally permissible scope of any
measure designed to discourage ... dissemination"14 of obscenity, be-
cause of lack of consensus on the word's meaning. The author and this
reviewer agree about the clarity of Justice Harlan's argument in Alberts
v. California'5 concerning the relative role of federal courts and state
governments (Carmen calls it "a study in the lucid and the logical"'6 ),
but differ on Harlan's federalism argument as applied in Roth. Car-
men feels the latter is based on value judgments about where obscenity
could best be handled and thinks Harlan hangs the distinction between
9 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
10 Holmby Productions v. Vaughn, 177 Kan. 728, 282 P.2d 412 (1953),
retid, 350 U.S. 870 (1955).
11355 U.S. 371 (1958.
12 355 U.S. 372 (1958)
13 S. Wasby, The Pure and the Prurient: The Politics of Obscene Literature
in Oregon, 1962 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon); S.
Washy, The Supreme Court, Obscenity, and Oregon Policy, 1964 (paper pre-
sented to American Political Science Association).
14 I. CARMN, MovIEs, CENSOnS=,, AND THE LA-W 81 (1966).
1;354 U.S. 476 (1957).
10 L CARxMEN, supra note 14, at 76.
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state and federal treatment on hard-core pornography; this reviewer
believes the Justice based the difference in the roles he prescribed for
the two levels of government on a "clear and present danger" require-
ment, not an unreasonable distinction in terms of the historical argu-
ment which Harlan in part utilizes.
Carmen's picture of state and local censorship is most thorough in
terms of the variety of existing conditions, different support, variable
entanglement with the courts, and organizational hodge-podge. In-
formal practices, e.g., restricting a film to the "art house circuit," show
the censors' discretion; in addition, cuts made to transform a film into
the "suitable for Sunday viewing" category are retained during the
week. The broad impact of the work of the censors also becomes im-
minently clear in light of the fact that cuts ordered by one state are
felt elsewhere because central distributors do not prepare more than
one version of a film. Also, one state statute incorporated by reference
the standards of a private reviewing organization and the New York
censors.
The presentation of the interview material provides some dif-
ficulties. The interview form and interview protocols are reproduced
in the Appendix. Comments on the interview form, which should have
been relegated to a Methodological Note in the Appendix, are first
presented. Then, in summarizing interviews with particular officials,
Carmen, presuming the reader has read the interviews first, refers to
specific questions by number, requiring frequent reference to the end
of the volume. A narrative discussion of the interview results would
have been preferable to the present awkward arrangement. Fasci-
nating as the protocols are, they should be read separately. Carmen
seems somewhat surprised by the frankness of many individuals con-
nected with censorship systems. While this reaction is perhaps justi-
fied because of the refusal of Kansas officials to be interviewed and
of Detroit personnel to allow publication of their interviews, it must
be remembered both that public officials are accustomed to being
interviewed and that they probably do not have the suspicion of out-
siders from the academic community Carmen may have presumed
them to have. Carmen's personal impressions of the people he inter-
viewed, however important for "local color," do not add to the book
(the same can be said for his personal footnote opinions on some
movies he has seen). The author's surprise at the large role the
Executive Assistant plays in the Maryland arrangement suggests some
naivete about the amount of power full-time officials (albeit "staff as-
sistants") have over part-time officials who are formally their superiors.
The interviews are presented to illuminate local practices, not to
[Vol. 56,
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provide the basis for a statistical study. The principal purpose in their
use seems to have been to allow us to compare the censors' responses
with court standards, in line with the author's "basic supposition...
that Supreme Court decisions are of minimal value unless they are
given support at the communal level."17 Certainly, along with statutory
analysis, they provide substantial evidence for the author's conclusion
that "Each city and each state using a systematic program of movie
censorship here surveyed operates under a legal framework that is in
some measure at the least, violative of due process and at the most, in
conflict with Burstyn v. Wilson and its free speech corollaries."18
Not content with summarizing, the author discusses possible
changes in the system. Carmen seems to prefer a Kingsley Books type
of in rem injunctive procedure applied to movies allowing classifica-
tion to protect children. He does look at existing practices in this
area of the lav, and suggests that use of a Roth-Alberts "average per-
son" standard would solve most vagueness problems. However, Car-
men fails to remember his own observation about classifications: that
they strike at the major markets of some distributors and thus restrict
the number and type of films made available. Moreover, if one believes
critics of our society's sexual morality, many of our adults are
clearly not mature, and a child/adult distinction as the basis for film
classification would not be satisfactory. This last section shows the
difficulty of jumping from description and analysis to prescription.
Little foundation is laid for Carmen's jump. While his opinions are
certainly shared by many, his study does not equip him to make such
preferential statements on any better basis than the rest of us. Car-
men knows the law, its impact, and can perhaps say what would at
present pass the Court's scrutiny, but this is not the same as saying
which procedures should be enacted into law. As the Justices them-
selves would agree, that a law will survive their scrutiny is no final test
of its wisdom. This difficulty in the author's argument is made most
clear when he says that society has a right "to be protected from the
revulsions of obscenity,"19 and then, in what is clearly a non-sequitur.
asserts that "adults may be kept from seeing films whose dominant
appeal relates to the prurient instincts of the average person."-"
Adults could as easily decide for themselves and voluntarily turn away,
particularly if they are the "enlightened, mature" people Carmen says
the first amendment presumes.
17 Id. at 225.
18 Id. at 241.
'9 Id. at 259.
20 Id.
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This criticism applies only to a minor portion of the book. Even
the above mentioned problems of interview presentation do not inter-
fere with the author's providing a vast amount of wvell-organized,
valuable material. Carmen has rendered scholars in the civil liberties
area, and in the field of obscenity and censorship law in particular, a
tremendous service in writing this definitive volume. Movies, Censor-
ship, and the Law deserves to be widely read, inside the legal pro-
fession and out; it will be easily understood by both groups.
Stephen L. Wasby*
* Assistant Professor
Department of Government
Southern Illinois University
